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ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
Match-fixing: Moral challenges for those involved
Stef Van Der Hoeven , Els De Waegeneer , Bram Constandt , and Annick Willem
Department of Movement and Sports Sciences of Ghent University
ABSTRACT
Match-fixing is a major ethical issue in sports. Although research interest in
match-fixing has increased in recent years, we remain largely in the dark
regarding how both betting- and non-betting-related match-fixing relate to
the moral decision-making of those involved. Drawing on Rest’s theory of
morality and on the perceptions of a large sample (n = 567) of participants
in Flemish sports, this study indicates that most match-fixing incidents are
non-betting-related, while moral motivation and associated challenges
clearly differ according to the type of match-fixing. Therefore, each type
of match-fixing requires different preventive measures.
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Introduction
In recent years, maintaining the integrity of sports has become an increasingly complex challenge
(Aquilina & Chetcuti, 2014; Gokhale, 2009; Hill, 2010; Spapens & Olfers, 2015). Next to practices
such as doping, management fraud, transfers of adolescent players, human trafficking, and hooli-
ganism, many sports have been confronted with match-fixing (i.e., the manipulation of sports
competitions) (Spapens & Olfers, 2015). Although match-fixing is as old as sport itself and has
already occurred in a wide variety of sports and countries (see Carpenter, 2012; Chappelet, 2015;
Huggins, 2018; Maennig, 2005), the advancement of the Internet in the mid-1990s facilitated
a dramatic increase in its size and complexity (Kerr, 2017; Lastra, Bell, & Bond, 2018).
At the same time, match-fixing has become heavily opposed as it may have several detrimental
consequences. First, match-fixing damages the uncertainty of sports (competitions) results, which, in
turn, endangers sports’ popularity (Chappelet, 2015). Removing this uncertainty can damage these
sports as a discipline. Likely consequences include (but are not limited to) a decreased public interest
in sports, sponsors refusing to associate their image with sports, the media turning its back, and
clubs ceasing to exist due to a lack of resources (Boniface et al., 2012). This is not just the case for
sports but also for the sports betting sector itself, which could suffer extensive financial losses. In the
long run, people might be reluctant to spend money on a corrupted and untrustworthy system
(Rebeggiani & Rebeggiani, 2013). Second, the mental and physical integrity of the people who are
approached to fix a match (e.g., athletes, officials, and team administrators)—as well as their families
and friends—is greatly at risk. These people and their environments are often faced with threats and
violence when involved in a match-fixing event (Boniface et al., 2012; FIFPro, 2012).
Although match-fixing has thus presented itself as a major concern for sports, relatively little
empirical academic work has been conducted until recently (Hill, 2009a, 2009b; Nowy & Breuer,
2017; Numerato, 2016; Spapens & Olfers, 2015). Both Boniface et al. (2012) and Spapens and Olfers
(2013) analyzed different motives and ways to fix a match. Some authors have discussed how to
implement prevention against the threat of match-fixing (Chappelet, 2015; Nowy & Breuer, 2017)
while formulating recommendations to combat match-fixing (Boniface et al., 2012; Bozkurt, 2012;
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Holden & Rodenberg, 2017; Husting et al., 2012). Several researchers have analyzed betting odds in
order to detect fixed matches (Feustel & Rodenberg, 2015; Ötting, Langrock, & Deutscher, 2018;
Reade & Akie, 2013). Hill (2009a, 2009b) has undertaken ground-breaking work by investigating the
motives, incentives, and mechanisms used by corruptors to approach athletes and eventually fix
soccer matches. Lastra et al. (2018) revealed that there is a considerable lack of understanding and
awareness of betting-related match-fixing among both athletes and non-athletes. Generally, the
literature has identified three main causes of match-fixing originating from: (a) criminal organiza-
tions and illegal sports betting; (b) (financially) vulnerable individuals; and (c) weak governance of
sports organizations (Tak, Sam, & Jackson, 2018).
Although the abovementioned studies illustrate the emergence of a research tradition on match-
fixing, several individual vulnerabilities have not been fully addressed. For example, there is still a lack of
knowledge about how athletes, coaches, and referees1 perceive themselves as potential targets (see
Boniface et al., 2012; Lastra et al., 2018), how they are approached (see Hill, 2009a, 2009b), and what
makes them decide to agree on a proposed fix (see Hill, 2015). Moreover, an ethical theoretical frame-
work is rarely used in the study of match-fixing even though match-fixing is an ethical issue as well as
a criminal problem (Harvey, 2015). However, we do not know how match-fixing relates to an indivi-
dual’s moral decision-making process. Given this context, the present study largely advances our
knowledge regarding match-fixing by addressing the following research questions:
(1) What is the prevalence of match-fixing in Flemish sports?
(2) How does match-fixing relate to moral decision-making?
Literature review
Defining match-fixing
During the past few years, several match-fixing conceptualizations and definitions have been
established by different researchers and associations. For instance, Preston and Szymanski (2003)
first described match-fixing as follows:
Individual contestants may be willing to reduce their effort contribution for specific matches if the rewards for
so doing are large enough. Sometimes this occurs either because the opposition values the victory significantly
more and is willing to pay to secure it, and sometimes it occurs because there is an opportunity to generate
returns on the insider information (for example, through gambling). (p. 613)
Ten years later, Hill (2013) offered a more concise definition, stating that match-fixing takes place
“when a player or referee deliberately underperforms during a sporting contest to ensure that one
team loses or draws the match” (p. 32). Furthermore, the Council of Europe (2014) did not explicitly
write about match-fixing but provided a definition of “manipulation of sports competitions”:
An intentional arrangement, act, or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of
a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports
competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others. (art. 3.4)
These definitions, however, are not detailed enough to deal with the problem in practice as match-
fixing assumes varied forms depending on who is involved and for what reasons (Tak et al., 2018).
Match-fixing can be classified into two major types based on whether or not the match-fixing case at
hand is related to betting (Hill, 2015; Spapens & Olfers, 2015). On the one hand, non-betting-related
match-fixing focuses primarily on sporting interests (Boniface et al., 2012; Duggan & Levitt, 2002;
Spapens & Olfers, 2015). Examples of this type involve circumventing relegation by making agree-
ments with the opposite team or athlete (see Hill, 2008), losing a match to avoid meeting certain
1The term “referees” refers to “linesmen,” “jury members,” and “officials” throughout this study.
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competitors or teammates in the next round of a round-robin competition system (see Yang & Liu,
2013), or enabling another team to win a championship (see Boniface et al., 2012). This kind of
match-fixing clearly breaches the Olympic motto, “Higher, Faster, Stronger,” which encourages all
participants to pursue victory and perform at one’s best (Yang & Liu, 2013). However, Butcher and
Schneider (1998) assumed that this pursuit of victory is indispensable in obtaining a fair game.
Therefore, non-betting-related match-fixing can be seen as an infringement on the principles of fair
play, conceptualized as respect for the game (Butcher & Schneider, 1998; De Waegeneer & Willem,
2016). Nevertheless, this type of match-fixing is “still about achieving success, albeit delayed success
or ‘cheating to win’” (Boniface et al., 2012, p. 5; Tak et al., 2018, p. 74).
On the other hand is the well-known betting-related match-fixing, which has grown enormously
in scope over the past two decades (Boniface et al., 2012; Hill, 2013; Huggins, 2018). This type of
match-fixing is considered a sub-dimension of corruption in sports, which is “any illegal, immoral,
or unethical activity that attempts to deliberately distort the result of a sporting contest for the
personal material gain of one or more parties involved in that activity” (Gorse & Chadwick, 2010,
p. 43). Consequently, the main reason for participating in betting-related match-fixing is most often
purely financial (Spapens & Olfers, 2015). Specifically, the purpose of this kind of match-fixing is to
make money by placing a bet on a fixed match (Hill, 2008). The subject of fixing can be either the
outcome of the match or a specific event during the match (a practice called “spot-fixing”) (Serby,
2015).
Additionally, Spapens and Olfers (2015) made a second important distinction between match-
fixing incidents in which the individuals who must arrange “the fix” participate voluntarily and cases
in which they are bribed or coerced. An individual (e.g., a player or referee), may take the initiative
to manipulate a match without being bribed or influenced by others (Spapens & Olfers, 2015). This
scenario is called “lone-wolf match-fixing,” regardless of whether or not it involves betting (Holden
& Rodenberg, 2017). However, it is also possible that multiple people will agree to fix a match
without bribes or coercion (Spapens & Olfers, 2015). In other circumstances, outsiders may bribe or
coerce the people who are able to directly influence the course of a match (Spapens & Olfers, 2015).
The sharing of sensitive inside information is not considered a type of match-fixing in this work,
as long as the course or the result of the match is not manipulated to achieve a guaranteed outcome
(Spapens & Olfers, 2013). In this respect, Harvey (2015) stated that the use of insider information—
for the purpose of gaining an advantage in the betting markets—does not undermine the value of
sports since its impact is purely on those involved in gambling on sports. Nevertheless, the sharing
and gathering of insider information is considered a risky practice that could induce match-fixing
(Spapens & Olfers, 2013). In summary, Figure 1 displays the different types of match-fixing, taking
into account the aforementioned distinctions.
Prevalence of match-fixing
As mentioned earlier, empirical research on match-fixing has been rather scarce (Hill, 2009b; Nowy &
Breuer, 2017; Numerato, 2016; Spapens & Olfers, 2015). Over the past few years, match-fixing has
nevertheless gained increased attention from both authorities and researchers (Huggins, 2018).
International studies have resulted in a number of reports that discuss a wide array of insights into
sports corruption in general and match-fixing in particular (Boniface et al., 2012; Gorse & Chadwick,
2011; University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne & International Centre for Sport Security, 2014; Van
Rompuy, 2015). With specific regard to the European context, research has been conducted to gain
a better understanding of the problem of match-fixing in this area (FIFPro, 2012; Harvey & Levi, 2014;
Husting et al., 2012; Nowy & Breuer, 2017; Theodorou, 2017). For instance, FIFPro (2012), the world-
wide soccer athletes’ association, interrogated 3,357 Eastern European soccer athletes from 15 different
countries about match-fixing. This inquiry revealed that 11.9% of the players had been approached to
match-fix, and 23.6% of the respondents thought that match-fixing had occurred in their national
competition (FIFPro, 2012). In cases where players had not received their salary on time, the research
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showed that 55% of them had been approached to consider match-fixing (FIFPro, 2012). However, an
important limitation of this study is the absence of a distinction between betting- and non-betting-related
match-fixing (FIFPro, 2012).
Another empirical study conducted by Theodorou (2017) used a quantitative survey to collect
data about match-fixing from athletes belonging to twelve different sports disciplines. The results
revealed that 12.6% of the respondents said they had played in a match that was fixed, 15% stated
that they had been approached by someone in the last twelve months who asked them to fix a match,
and 34.7% of the respondents believed that matches in their league may have been fixed in the past
12 months (Theodorou, 2017). The respondents also indicated that the most likely instigators for
match-fixing were board members of the club (38.1%), other athletes (16.2%), referees (9.8%), and—
last but not least—people from outside the sport (8.9%) (e.g., a member of a criminal gang,
a bookmaker, or an athlete’s agent) (Theodorou, 2017). Furthermore, their data revealed that most
athletes agree to fix a match because of financial difficulties (34.6%), pressure from other athletes or
officials (27.5%), the opportunity to earn easy money (23.7%), pressure from external persons
(16.8%), threats of violence toward family or friends (14.5%), or because of a general cultural
acceptance of match-fixing (9.5%) (Theodorou, 2017).
However, as the nature of match-fixing can differ from country to country (see Harvey & Levi,
2014), multiple researchers have investigated match-fixing in various national contexts (e.g., Malta,
see Aquilina & Chetcuti, 2014; Italy, see Costa, 2018; Australia, see Lastra et al., 2018; Taiwan, see
Lee, 2017; Greece, see Manoli & Antonopoulos, 2015; Iberian countries, see Moriconi, 2018;
Zimbabwe, see Ncube, 2017; Czech Republic, see Numerato, 2016; Germany, see Pitsch, Emrich,
& Pierdzioch, 2012; the Netherlands, see Spapens & Olfers, 2013, 2015; Turkey, see Yilmaz, Manoli,
& Antonopoulos, 2018; Belgium, see Zamante, 2012). With respect to Belgium, the Belgian social
network site for soccer athletes, Zamante (2012), conducted an online survey of 945 athletes who
were particularly active on an amateur (nonprofessional/nonprofit) level. This survey revealed that
14.5% of them had been contacted directly to fix one of their matches, and 27.8% of the approached
match-fixing*
non-betting-
related match-
fixing
no bribery or 
coercion
involving bribery 
or coercion
betting-related 
match-fixing
match-fixing*
no bribery or 
coercion
involving bribery 
or coercion
spot-fixing
no bribery or 
coercion
involving bribery 
or coercion
Figure 1. Overview of the different types of match-fixing.
* The notion “match-fixing” is used twice in Figure 1, once as an overarching term and once as a specific subdivision
within betting-related match-fixing. This conceptualization can cause confusion among readers, but the contem-
porary literature does not provide an unambiguous classification. A possible amendment of the current conceptua-
lization of match-fixing and the design of a possible new overarching term is beyond the scope of this research.
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had agreed to take part in the manipulation (Zamante, 2012). The results also showed that more than
a third of the respondents claimed to know one or more athletes or coaches who had been contacted
by match-fixers (Zamante, 2012).
In the Netherlands, a thorough empirical study was implemented by Spapens and Olfers (2013, 2015),
who collected data through three research methods (whereof one web survey was completed by 732
respondents). This survey targeted (former) athletes, coaches, referees, and sports agents from soccer,
tennis, horseracing, boxing, and basketball (Spapens & Olfers, 2013, 2015). The questionnaire unveiled
that 27% (n = 181) of the respondents believed that match-fixing has occurred in their own environment
(Spapens & Olfers, 2013, 2015). More specifically, 19% (n = 127) thought that match-fixing could have
taken place in their own league, 16% (n = 107) in games in which they participated, and 7% (n = 47)
within their own team (Spapens & Olfers, 2013, 2015). Of the cases in which respondents suspected
manipulation, 44% concerned non-betting-related match-fixing, and 20% were betting-related (Spapens
& Olfers, 2013, 2015). For the remaining 36%, respondents did not know why the match was manipu-
lated (Spapens & Olfers, 2013, 2015). Moreover, the results showed that the outcome of the match was
fixed in 83% of the cases, events during thematch were influenced in 23% of the cases, and the exact score
in 14% of the cases (Spapens & Olfers, 2013, 2015). The percentage of respondents claiming to know
people who have been approached to fix matches or had been invited themselves to manipulate games
was relatively low: 8% and 4%, respectively (Spapens &Olfers, 2013, 2015). Moreover, the majority of the
cases concerned non-betting-related match-fixing (Spapens & Olfers, 2013, 2015). The approaching
parties were, in most cases, the opponent (35%), followed by the club (14%) and team members (6%)
(Spapens & Olfers, 2013, 2015).
Match-fixing as an ethical issue: Rest’s model
Match-fixing—regardless of the type—is considered a moral2 dilemma as it is a situation with moral
principles attached that requires a response or decision (Garrigan, Adlam, & Langdon, 2018). More
precisely, people who are subject to a match-fixing proposal must deal with a number of moral
considerations before they potentially engage in match-fixing. As already mentioned, the fair play
principle is clearly breached in the case of non-betting-related match-fixing. When it comes to
betting-related match-fixing, not only is the sport itself affected, but the betting industry is also
abused to make money in what could be seen as a dishonest way. Furthermore, the integrity of the
people involved is often harmed. As such, the potential act of match-fixing is the result of a moral
decision-making process that considers these ethical issues. According to Garrigan et al. (2018),
moral decision-making is a complex process that refers to any decision—including judgments,
evaluations, and responses—made within the “moral domain.” These decisions relate to moral issues
or principles such as justice, harm, fairness, and care. After a moral decision has been made, a moral
action (moral behavior) will most likely follow. Behavior that conforms to or follows moral
principles is referred to as prosocial behavior (or a moral action), whereas behavior that violates
a moral principle is referred to as antisocial behavior (or an immoral action) (Garrigan et al., 2018;
Sokolowski, 1985). Given the abovementioned reasons, engaging in match-fixing is considered an
antisocial behavior or an immoral action.
Many different theories and perspectives on moral decision-making have been developed over the
years (e.g., social intuitionist theory, see Haidt, 2001; moral domain theory, see Smetana, 2006).
However, moral psychology has been dominated by the rationalist, cognitive-developmental per-
spective, employing stage theories to explain moral development (Garrigan et al., 2018). Piaget’s
(1932) theory of logical reasoning for moral development in children is generally considered the first
cognitive-developmental theory. Kohlberg (1969) then extended Piaget’s theory beyond childhood,
stating that an individual’s capacity for moral reasoning also depends on his/her capacity for logical
reasoning. Therefore, he proposed six sequential stages of moral judgment that one must pass
2For the purpose of this study, the terms “ethics” and “morality” are considered synonymous.
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through, each in turn. Despite its enormous contribution, however, Kohlberg’s theory has not been
without criticism (e.g., Boyes & Walker, 1988; Krebs & Denton, 2005; Locke, 1979). A crucial
advancement within the field of moral development was realized by Rest (1986), who revised
Kohlberg’s theory while focusing on moral action as the end point. In contrast to Kohlberg’s
proposition of seeing moral development as occurring one stage at a time, Rest (1986) proposed
that moral development takes place gradually, leading to more mature forms of thinking. After all,
unethical behavior can also be caused by a lack of awareness of the relevant moral factors and
implications or due to a lack of self-control.
This gradual nuance in Rest’s theory is important for the study of match-fixing as an ethical issue
since it allows us to assess athletes’, coaches’, and referees’ decision-making processes when con-
sidering whether to fix a match. Therefore, this study used Rest’s (1986) model, which requires the
successful handling of four steps to come to ethical behavior. The first step, moral sensitivity, refers
to an individual’s ability to recognize that a situation contains a moral issue. The second step, moral
judgment, refers to the evaluation of the moral justification of different possible solutions to the
moral issue (i.e., “which action is morally right or wrong?”). The third step is moral motivation,
which refers to the intention to choose the moral decision over another solution representing
a different value (e.g., financial gain or personal reputation). The final step is moral character,
which involves the courage, determination, and ability to follow through with the moral decision.
Although these steps are ordered logically, they are not sequential (i.e., the steps are distinct, yet they
can overlap time-wise). A failure in any of these steps can result in the failure to make an ethical
decision (Lincoln & Holmes, 2011). Thus, in the case of match-fixing, four different obstacles need
to be overcome to eventually make a moral decision: not being aware of the fact that match-fixing
may be an ethical issue (moral sensitivity), not thinking of match-fixing as something wrong (moral
judgment), choosing another motivation over the moral decision not to fix a match (moral motiva-
tion), and not having the strength or courage to effectuate the moral decision under the pressure of
others or due to coercion or bribery (moral character) (Constandt & Willem, 2019).
Method
To assess the prevalence of match-fixing, a quantitative research method was used, based on
a closed questionnaire. The outline of this study was approved by the independent ethics commis-
sion of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of the authors’ host institution. Data
were collected using an online questionnaire. All participants completed the questionnaire volun-
tarily, while they were also assured that the answers would be processed anonymously and not
passed on to third parties. Moreover, participants were assured that they could quit the ques-
tionnaire at any time without consequence.
Sample
All data were collected in Flanders, which is the Dutch-speaking region of Belgium. The final sample
consisted of 567 adult members (18 years or older; 80.2% male; 59.4% athletes; 85.2% active on an
amateur level) who were affiliated with the Flemish sports federations of soccer, tennis, or badminton.
Soccer and tennis were chosen as these sports disciplines have already suffered from a large number of
corruption scandals (Boniface et al., 2012). Badminton was added since this discipline gave rise to
a discussion on non-betting-related match-fixing at the London Olympic Games of 2012, which made
academics and practitioners hone their stance on the subject (Blair, 2018; Sailors, Teetzel, & Weaving,
2015; Yang & Liu, 2013). To reach appropriate participants (18 years or older and affiliated with the
Flemish sports federations of soccer, tennis, or badminton), the online questionnaire was communicated
on the Facebook pages of Flemish soccer, tennis, and badminton clubs. The Flemish soccer federation
also provided help by sending an email to all its members explaining the purpose of the study and
containing the web link to the questionnaire. Furthermore, the authors visited several Flemish soccer,
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tennis, and badminton clubs and tournaments in person to recruit participants. To appease a possible
social desirability bias, an anonymous approach was used to ensure that respondents confessing to forms
of corruption could not be identified (Gorsira, Denkers, & Huisman, 2018). Specifically, respondents
were assured anonymity by not being asked to indicate identifying information on the questionnaire.
This guarantee of anonymity minimized the impact of social desirability (Joinson, 1999; Nederhof, 1985;
Paulhus, 1984). Moreover, the data were controlled on self-selection bias by comparing the age, the
sports disciplines, and the number of reports of personal match-fixing approaches of the respondents
who were contacted at a sports club or at a tournament to fill in the survey (n = 164) with those who
completed the questionnaire through email or Facebook (n = 403). By recruiting respondents in these
two ways, we were able to compare the results of respondents who volunteered to complete the
questionnaires, without personal contact with the researchers, with results of respondents who were
randomly approached and asked to participate. Additionally, a smaller self-selection bias is expected with
the respondents who were approached randomly since this method reaches more random people. No
significant differences were found between the groups regarding age, sports disciplines, and the number
of reports of personal match-fixing approaches. The final data were checked for missing values by
performing a missing value analysis. Two variables had in total 87 user missing values (“I don’t know”)
and 12 variables had in total 5,824 systemmissing values (“Not applicable,” i.e., due to the structure of the
questionnaire, the majority of the respondents were not referred to all the questions). Missing values
were excluded analysis by analysis, i.e., a complete-case analysis for each separate research question
(Little & Rubin, 2019; Molenberghs & Kenward, 2007).
Questionnaire
An online questionnaire was developed in which the participants were asked about both direct and
indirect experiences with proposals to fix a match. The work of Spapens and Olfers (2013) functioned as
starting point for our questionnaire, but certain questions—targeting issues such as spot-fixing and
Rest’s model (1986)—were added. The questionnaire consisted of 25 questions, 10 of which were
multiple choice questions to which the respondents had to choose one answer, 8 multiple choice
questions to which the respondents could give multiple answers, 5 dichotomous questions, and 2 fill-in-
the-blank spaces. On average, it took five to ten minutes to complete the questionnaire. After the
designing phase, the questionnaire was programmed in the online program LimeSurvey. Before the
questionnaire was dispersed online, a pilot test was conducted to ensure its reliability. The first part of
the questionnaire included questions about the participants’ characteristics. Subsequently, respondents
were asked how they estimated the risk of coming into contact with match-fixing and proposals to fix
a match. When they testified of match-fixing cases, whether indirect (they knew of fixes in their sports)
or direct (they were approached to fix a match themselves), their reactions and the underlying
motivations were further investigated, based on Rest’s model (1986). Additionally, we examined who
tried to approach them and how this worked out. We asked whether any monetary or other compensa-
tions were offered and what the motivation behind the proposal to fix was (e.g., making money through
betting, avoiding relegation, and/or avoiding a strong opponent in the next round of the tournament).
Finally, the questionnaire measured if there were any threats or incidents of violence involved with the
match-fixing event and if the respondents had reported their suspicions or experiences with match-
fixing to anyone.
Data analysis
Data analyses were performed with the statistical software SPSS 24. To control the data on self-
selection bias, an independent sample t-test was performed to compare the mean age of the two
groups of respondents that were recruited differently. Additionally, to test the effect of the recruit-
ment method on (a) the number of respondents who were involved in a certain sports discipline and
(b) the number of reports of personal match-fixing approaches, two chi-square analyses were
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conducted. Descriptive statistics were then used to describe participants’ characteristics, the pre-
valence of match-fixing, match-fixing types, and the reasons and motives behind match-fixing.
A one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA; followed by univariate analyses) was
applied to compare the respondents involved in soccer, tennis, and badminton with regard to
their perceptions about how serious match-fixing might be in their own sports discipline and the
risk that they could be approached themselves to match-fix. The dependent variables in the one-way
MANOVA were (a) “I think match-fixing is a real problem in my sports discipline in Flanders” and
(b) “I think there is a risk that I could be approached myself to fix a match,” whereas the fixed factor
was the “sports discipline.” Finally, a correlation analysis was performed to examine the relationship
between both dependent variables of the one-way MANOVA.
Results
A total of 403 respondents completed the questionnaire through email or Facebook, while 164
respondents filled in the questionnaire after they were approached randomly and asked to participate.
Those who completed the questionnaire through email or Facebook did not differ significantly in age
(M = 37.1, SD = 15.5) from those who were randomly approached (M = 35.9, SD = 13.0) (independent
sample t-test: t = .973, df = 357, p > .10). Two chi-square analyses showed that (a) respondents
involved in certain sports disciplines were not significantly more represented in either of the two
recruiting groups (χ2 (2) = 3.484, p > .10), and (b) no significant difference was found between the
groups regarding the reporting of personal match-fixing approaches (χ2 (1) = .025, p > .10). Since no
significant differences were found between the recruited groups, the presence of a self-selection bias is
unlikely. The specific characteristics of all respondents are shown in Table 1.
No fewer than 104 respondents (18.3%, or almost one fifth, of the 567 respondents) reported
(proposed) match-fixing incidents on the questionnaire. More specifically, 68 persons (12.0%) knew
of someone (not themselves) who had been approached for match-fixing. Next to this, 33
Table 1. Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics of the Questionnaire Respondents (descriptive Statistics).
total (n = 567) soccer3 (n = 347) tennis4 (n = 41) badminton5 (n = 179)
gender
man 80.2% 90.8% 70.7% 62.0%
woman 19.8% 9.2% 29.3% 38.0%
age: M (SD) 36.8 (14.8) 37.7 (16.2) 33.3 (15.3) 35.8 (11.6)
way of involvement
athlete 59.4% 42.7% 73.2% 88.8%
former athlete 7.8% 10.1% 12.2% 2.2%
trainer 5.8% 6.9% 4.9% 3.9%
referee/jury member 1.6% 2.3% 2.4% 0.0%
other 25.4% 38.0% 7.3% 5.0%
level of involvement
professional 4.8% 2.9% 29.3% 2.8%
semi-professional 10.1% 6.6% 19.5% 14.5%
amateur 85.2% 90.5% 51.2% 82.7%
playing level
international 4.4% 3.5% 22.0% 2.2%
national 24.3% 28.0% 39.0% 14.0%
provincial 56.1% 59.9% 26.8% 55.3%
recreational 15.2% 8.6% 12.2% 28.5%
M = mean, SD = standard deviation
3There are 3073 soccer clubs in Flanders, which are recognized by the Flemish soccer federation (Voetbal Vlaanderen, 2018).
4There are 454 tennis clubs in Flanders, which are recognized by the Flemish tennis federation (Tennis Vlaanderen, 2018).
5There are 214 badminton clubs in Flanders, which are recognized by the Flemish badminton federation (Badminton
Vlaanderen, 2019).
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respondents (5.8%) knew of someone who had been approached for match-fixing and acknowledged
to have been approached personally for match-fixing, and 3 respondents (0.5%) indicated to have
been approached personally for match-fixing without knowing of anyone else who had also been
approached. In all, the respondents indicated 101 cases (17.8%) of knowing that someone else had
been approached for a match-fixing proposal and 36 cases (6.3%) of having been approached
themselves. The latter case involved a non-betting-related proposal in 91.7% (n = 33) of the incidents
and a betting-related proposal in 8.3% (n = 3) of the incidents.
Perceptions about match-fixing, its seriousness, and risks
The questionnaire revealed that 36.3% (n = 206) of the 567 respondents believed that match-fixing
had occurred in their own environment. More specifically, 36.3% (n = 206) thought that match-
fixing could have taken place in their own competition or tournament, 22% (n = 125) in games in
which they participated, and 16.9% (n = 96) within their own team. Of course, these answers do not
mean that match-fixing actually took place. Rather, these figures can be seen as a first indication of
the awareness of match-fixing. Moreover, a significant difference is noticed between the sports
disciplines regarding (a) the estimation that match-fixing is a real problem in their sports discipline
in Flanders; and (b) the assessment that they could be approached themselves for match-fixing
(one-way MANOVA: Wilks’ λ = .791, F (4, 970) = 30.139, p < .001, η2p = .111). When it comes to the
respondents’ belief that their sport is compromised by match-fixing, the results of the questionnaire
show (see first column Table 2) a significant difference between the different sports disciplines
(univariate effect: F (2, 486) = 55.193, p < .001, η2p = .185). Soccer athletes, coaches, and referees
assess the risk of match-fixing in their sports higher than do the actors in tennis (Tukey’s honestly
significant difference test [Tukey’s HSD] p < .05) and badminton (Tukey’s HSD p < .001). In
addition, tennis athletes, coaches, and referees assess the risk of match-fixing in their sports higher
than those involved in badminton do (Tukey HSD p < .01). This is shown in Table 2, in which the
mean results for the three sports disciplines are scored on a four-point scale, whereby “1” is a very
high estimation of the risk, and “4” a very low assessment of the risk. Respondents could also
indicate that they had no idea of the extent of the issue. Moreover, there appeared to be a significant
difference between the sports disciplines regarding the estimation of whether they could be
approached themselves for match-fixing (univariate effect: F (2, 486) = 34.549, p < .001,
η2p = .124). As displayed in the second column of Table 2, soccer and tennis athletes, coaches,
and referees believe that there is a much higher chance that they could be confronted themselves
with proposals to fix a match than is the case with those involved in badminton (Tukey’s HSD
p < .001). No significant difference was found between those involved in soccer and tennis
regarding the estimation of whether they could be approached themselves with proposals to fix
a match (Tukey’s HSD p > .10). The results indicate that the respondents, regardless of the sports
discipline, clearly underestimate the chance of being approached themselves, compared to the
chance that match-fixing is a problem in their own sports discipline in Flanders. Furthermore,
a positive significant relationship was found between these two variables (r (489) = .555, p < .001),
indicating that the higher one estimates that match-fixing is a real problem in their sports discipline
in Flanders, the higher one assesses the chance that they could be approached themselves to fix
a match.
Table 2 Perceptions of the Seriousness of Match-fixing and the Risk of Being Approached Personally (one-way MANOVA)
sports discipline
“match-fixing is a real problem in my
sports discipline in Flanders”*
(M ± SD)
“I could be approached for match-fixing”*
(M ± SD)
soccer 2.5 ± 0.8 3.0 ± 0.9
tennis 2.9 ± 0.8 3.0 ± 1.0
badminton 3.3 ± 0.6 3.7 ± 0.5
*p < .001, M = mean, SD = standard deviation
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Consent to a match-fixing proposal: approaches, rates, and motivations
Of the 36 respondents who indicated that they had been approached for match-fixing, 19.4% (n = 7)
admitted to have consented with the proposal and fixed the match at hand. When focusing on the 33
respondents who were approached for a non-betting-related fix, 18.2% (n = 6) consented to the
proposal. As shown in Table 3, The main rationale for consent was the importance of the fix for the
sporting interests of the sports club, followed by the money offered, and other reasons. More
specifically, the respondents who indicated that they consented to the proposal for another reason
Table 3. Details of the Respondents Who Indicated that They Had Been Approached for Match-fixing.
non-betting-related MF* betting-related MF*
n = 33 %** n = 3 %**
Did you consent with the proposal to fix the match? (multiple answers possible)
(a) Yes, because of the money offered 2 6.1 1 33.3
(b) Yes, because I was pressured by those who approached me 0 0.0 0 0.0
(c) Yes, because I was pressured by the team 1 3.0 0 0.0
(d) Yes, in the interest of the club 3 9.1 0 0.0
(e) Yes, other: … 2 6.1 0 0.0
(f) No, I did not consent with the proposal 27 81.8 2 66.7
What was the motive for approaching you? (multiple answers possible)
(a) To earn money by betting on the manipulated game/match 0 0.0 3 100
(b) To prevent a specific club or athlete form being relegated 26 78.8 0 0.0
(c) To determine who the next-round opponent would be 5 15.2 0 0.0
(d) To make the competition or tournament more exciting 4 12.1 0 0.0
(e) Other motive: … 5 15.2 0 0.0
(f) I don’t know 0 0.0 0 0.0
I am (one answer possible)
(a) Male 31 93.9 2 66.7
(b) Female 2 6.1 1 33.3
My sport is (was) (one answer possible)
(a) Soccer 27 81.8 1 33.3
(b) Tennis 2 6.1 2 66.7
(c) Badminton 4 12.1 0 0.0
At what level are (were) you involved? (one answer possible)
(a) Professional 1 3.0 2 66.7
(b) Semi-professional 5 15.2 1 33.3
(c) Amateur 27 81.8 0 0.0
What were the perpetrators seeking to influence? (multiple answers possible)
(a) The outcome of the game/match 28 84.8 2 66.7
(b) The exact result of the game/match 4 12.1 2 66.7
(c) Specific events during the game/match 1 3.0 1 33.3
(d) Other: … 1 3.0 0 0.0
Were you offered money to influence the game/match? (one answer possible)
(a) Yes 23 69.7 3 100
(b) No 10 30.3 0 0.0
Were you promised other material inducements to influence the game/match? (one answer possible)
(a) Yes 9 27.3 0 0.0
(b) No 24 72.7 3 100
Who approached you? (one answer possible)
(a) Teammates 1 3.0 1 33.3
(b) Club, association or federation 1 3.0 0 0.0
(c) Former athlete 0 0.0 0 0.0
(d) Opponent(s) 26 78.8 1 33.3
(e) Sponsors 2 6.1 0 0.0
(f) Trainer 2 6.1 0 0.0
(g) I don’t know by who 0 0.0 0 0.0
(h) Other: … 1 3.0 1 33.3
Were you threatened or pressured to influence the game/match? (one answer possible)
(a) Yes 0 0.0 0 0.0
(b) No 33 100 3 100
*MF = match-fixing
**The sum of the figures might exceed 100%, because multiple answers were possible to certain questions.
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reported, respectively, that “preventing the relegation of a sympathetic opponent does not seem like
a problem” and “it does not matter if you intentionally lose a set and eventually win the match.”
When examining the respondents who were approached for a betting-related fix (n = 3), just one
person consented to the proposal because of the money offered (see Table 3).
Match-fixing proposals: characteristics, stakes, and purposes
For respondents who declared that they had suspicions of match-fixing in their environment (36.3%,
n = 206), four groups can be distinguished: (a) those who suspected only non-betting-related match-
fixing (83.5%, n = 172), (b) those who suspected only betting-related match-fixing (5.8%, n = 12), (c)
those who suspected both types of fixing (3.9%, n = 8), and (d) those who were not aware of the
motive behind the fix (6.8%, n = 14). As shown in Table 4, the people who suspected only non-
betting-related match-fixing were mostly involved in soccer; only a few of these respondents were
involved in tennis or badminton. In the case of non-betting-related match-fixing, preventing the
relegation of an athlete or a club was the main purpose, followed by determining the opponent in the
next round of a tournament, and making the tournament or the competition more exciting. In 16.9%
of the cases, other sporting-related arguments were given (e.g., enabling or preventing a team from
winning the championship). Furthermore, the end result of the match (win/loss) was mostly at stake,
followed by specific events during the match and the exact score of the match. On the other hand,
5.8% (n = 12) suspected only betting-related fixing in their environment. Of this group, seven
persons were involved in soccer (whereof four involved at a [semi-] professional level), and five
persons were involved in tennis (all on a professional level). Nobody involved in badminton
suspected betting-related fixing in their environment. In the case of betting-related suspicions,
making money by betting on the manipulated match was the only purpose. Moreover, mostly the
Table 4. Details of the Respondents Who Had Suspicions of Match-fixing in Their Environment.
My sport is (was) (one answer possible)
only suspicions of non-betting-
related match-fixing
only suspicions of betting-
related match-fixing
n = 172 %* n = 12 %
(a) Soccer 142 82.6 7 58.3
(b) Tennis 10 5.8 5 41.7
(c) Badminton 20 11.6 0 0.0
If you think there has ever been a case of match-fixing in your own environment, what do you consider to have been the motive?
(multiple answers possible)
(a) To earn money by betting on the manipulated game/match 0 0.0 12 100
(b) To prevent a specific club or athlete from being relegated 129 75.0 0 0.0
(c) To determine who the next-round opponent would be 31 18.0 0 0.0
(d) To make the competition or tournament more exciting 14 8.1 0 0.0
(e) Other motive: … 29 16.9 0 0.0
(f) I don’t know 0 0.0 0 0.0
If you think there has ever been a case of match-fixing in your own environment, can you say what the perpetrators were seeking to
influence in these games/matches? (multiple answers possible)
(a) The outcome of the game/match 151 87.8 8 66.7
(b) The exact result of the game/match 9 5.2 1 8.3
(c) Specific events during the game/match 20 11.6 3 25.0
(d) Other: … 7 4.1 0 0.0
Have you ever reported your suspicions or experiences of match-fixing to anyone? (one answer possible)
n = 206 %
(a) Yes 71 34.5
(b) No 135 65.5
*The sum of the figures might exceed 100%, because multiple answers were possible to certain questions.
ETHICS & BEHAVIOR 11
end result of the game was at stake, followed by specific events during the match and the exact score
of the match. More details about these results are shown in Table 4.
When focusing on the respondents who reported that they had been directly approached (6.3%, n =
36), 7.3% (n = 33) of the male participants and 2.7% (n = 3) of the female participants reported this.
Looking at the types of match-fixing, only three respondents (8.3%) indicated that they had been offered
a betting-relatedmatch-fixing proposal. FromTable 3, it can be seen that this group consisted of twomen
and one woman who were involved in tennis and soccer on a (semi-) professional level. Moreover, in the
cases of betting-related fixes, the end result and the exact score of the match were mostly at stake for the
fixer, rather than specific events in the match. In the three betting-related cases, money was offered to
those who were approached. On the other hand, 33 respondents (91.7%) indicated that they were offered
a non-betting-related match-fixing proposal. The people who received these proposals were, in most
cases, men involved in soccer on an amateur level (see Table 3). Moreover, the main purpose of the
proposals was to prevent relegation of a known athlete or club, followed by determining the opponent in
the next round of a tournament, and making the competition or tournament more exciting. In 15.2% of
the cases, other motives were indicated. More specifically, these respondents mainly reported that the
instigators tried to “prevent or enable a team to win the championship.” The end result of the match was
mostly at stake for the fixer, rather than the exact score or certain specific events during the match.
Furthermore, 69.7% of the respondents who had been approached for a non-betting-related fix were
offered money. Next to this, 27.3% of them were also offered other material inducements, mainly
consumption goods (e.g., a keg of beer). More details about these results are shown in Table 3.
Being approached to match-fix: instigators, circumstances, and willingness to report
According to the 101 respondents (17.8%) who knew someone who had been approached for match-
fixing, proposals were mostly offered by opponents (see Table 5). For those who had been
approached personally for a non-betting-related fix (n = 33), the opponents were, again, the most
likely to approach, followed by trainers and sponsors (see Table 3). Those who had been approached
personally for a betting-related proposal indicated that they were approached by their own team-
mates, opponents, or bettors (see Table 3). No use of threat or violence was reported by any of the
respondents who have been approached personally. Furthermore, Table 4 reveals that of the persons
who had suspicions or experiences with match-fixing (36.3%, n = 206), no less than 65.5% kept the
information to themselves, and only 34.5% had ever reported it to anyone.
Discussion
An online questionnaire was developed and implemented to investigate (a) the prevalence of match-
fixing in Flemish soccer, tennis, and badminton and (b) how match-fixing relates to the moral
decision-making process of athletes, coaches, and referees in potentially fixing a match. The next two
sections will discuss one research question each.
Table 5. Details of the Respondents Who Knew Someone Who Had Been Approached for Match-fixing.
Who approached this person? (multiple answers possible)
n = 101 %*
(a) Teammates 12 11.9
(b) Club, association or federation 28 27.7
(c) Former athlete 2 2.0
(d) Opponent(s) 70 69.3
(e) Sponsors 8 7.9
(f) Trainer 10 9.9
(g) I don’t know by who 10 9.9
(h) Other: … 6 5.9
*The sum of the figures exceeds 100%, because multiple answers were possible to the question.
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Prevalence of match-fixing
Our research revealed that 6.3% (n = 36) of the respondents had been approached personally in regard to
match-fixing. Compared to the studies of FIFPro (2012), Zamante (2012), and Theodorou (2017), this
figure is relatively low. Since FIFPro (2012) and Zamante (2012) respectively focused on professional and
amateur soccer, it could be expected that their figures would be higher, as soccer is known as one of the
most affected sports (Boniface et al., 2012). Moreover, Theodorou’s (2017) study surveyed twelve
different sports disciplines using a time variable (i.e., the last twelve months); as such, it is difficult to
compare our results with those. However, in comparison with the research of Spapens and Olfers (2013,
2015), our research shows a slightly higher prevalence of direct match-fixing. Moreover, in the Dutch
study, non-betting-related match-fixing was shown to be much more common than betting-related
match-fixing. Our research unveiled that 17.8% (n = 101) knew someone who had been approached for
match-fixing. This figure is more than twice as large as that in the study of Spapens and Olfers (2013,
2015), which would imply that direct and indirect match-fixing proposals seem to occur more in
Flanders than in the Netherlands. However, these figures need to be put in perspective, as Spapens
and Olfers (2013, 2015) investigated five sports disciplines. As cultural differences might play a role,
a cross-cultural (or meta) study is recommended to analyze the impact of cultural differences on match-
fixing prevalence.
Moreover, the twofold nature of match-fixing is clearly represented in the results of our research
(Boniface et al., 2012). First, non-betting-related match-fixing involves mostly amateur soccer and
concerns the manipulation of gain and loss. This type of match-fixing is much more common, in
both direct proposals of match-fixing (91.7%) and when people suspect match-fixing in their
environment (83.5%). The most important stake is the prevention of relegation, and in most cases,
money or consumption goods are involved. In our study, no threat was involved in regard to this
type of match-fixing. Second, betting-related match-fixing typically takes place in a variety of sports
(soccer and tennis in this research) and at the (semi-) professional level. This type of match-fixing
occurs much less in both direct proposals of match-fixing (8.3%) and when people suspect match-
fixing in their environment (5.8%). Next to fixing the outcome of the match as a whole, the results
showed that spot-fixing is also taking place. Although the stakes are always money, there were no
reported cases of threats or violence.
The results also indicate that there is a lack of awareness among the respondents of the possibility
that match-fixing could occur in their own environment. These figures are fairly similar, in terms of
distribution, to the figures of the Dutch study of Spapens and Olfers (2013, 2015). However, the
results of our study indicate a slightly higher suspicion of match-fixing in the environment. This
implies that an awareness of the possible occurrence of match-fixing is higher in Flanders than in the
Netherlands. This finding can have multiple explanations: a real difference between the populations
(e.g., a cultural difference), more awareness of the risk of match-fixing in Flanders, and/or the fact
that suspicions are sometimes expressed in the press, which increases the alertness to match-fixing.
Unfortunately, these potential explanations are not conclusive.
Nevertheless, our figures show that more than one third (n = 206) of the respondents estimate the
risk of match-fixing as quite real, which is a considerably high figure given that match-fixing does
not actually have to occur. There is also a lack of awareness in athletes, coaches, and referees of the
belief that match-fixing is a real problem in their own sports discipline and the risk that they will be
confronted with match-fixing. The people involved in soccer were significantly more aware of the
dangers of match-fixing, compared to those involved in tennis and badminton. These results can
have multiple explanations: a greater occurrence of match-fixing in soccer, the larger media attention
that has recently been given to corruption and match-fixing scandals in soccer (Carpenter, 2012),
and/or the perception of soccer “as the one most strongly affected sports” (Chappelet, 2015).
However, when it comes to the assessment of whether they could be approached themselves for
match-fixing, there is no significant difference in the awareness between the actors involved in soccer
and tennis. This indicates that the people involved in tennis are also aware of their vulnerability to be
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approached personally for match-fixing, which can also be explained by the multiple scandals that
have already plagued tennis (Ramos, 2009) and the perception that fixing is easier in sports where
the actions of one individual could ensure the appropriate result (Carpenter, 2012; Huggins, 2018).
Furthermore, the greater awareness in tennis, in comparison to badminton, can potentially be
attributed to the globalized nature of tennis, a sport in which professional events are happening in
multiple time zones, across multiple continents, throughout the entire year (Harkin, 2017). The
results show that the higher one estimates match-fixing to be a real issue in their sports discipline,
the higher one assesses the chance to be personally involved. However, the majority of the
respondents estimated the risk of being approached themselves much lower than the general risk
of match-fixing in their own sports discipline. This lack of awareness needs to be addressed in order
to tackle the problem. This was also emphasized by Boniface et al. (2012), who stated that the
psychological factor is key because someone who is made aware of the issue will be inclined to
instantly perceive match-fixing approaches as a threat when approached indirectly or offered favors.
Moral decision-making process
Both types of match-fixing also clearly come into view when looking at the moral decision-making
process of the people approached to potentially fix a match. More specifically, our results indicate
that the majority of the people involved in non-betting-related match-fixing lack awareness of the
problem and seriously underestimate its risks. Even if these people are aware of the risks, they do not
always see match-fixing as an ethical issue but sometimes rather as a “friendly gesture” toward
another club or athlete, which highlights a lack of moral sensitivity. Moreover, even if they know that
an ethical issue is at hand, they often do not condemn fixing a match as morally wrong, i.e., a lack of
moral judgment. Therefore, the first two steps in Rest’s (1986) model appear to be more compro-
mised in the non-betting-related type of match-fixing. Consequently, both hurdles (i.e., a lack of
moral sensitivity and moral judgment) need to be overcome to solve the problem of match-fixing and
non-betting-related match-fixing in particular.
Compared to those involved in non-betting-related match-fixing, people involved in betting-
related fixing are well aware of the ethical aspects of this incident and acknowledge that this act is
wrong, i.e., they acknowledge the moral sensitivity and moral judgment in these cases. This finding
supports the work of Hill (2015), who argued that athletes know the correct ethical position in
match-fixing but decide to fix a match due to rational decision-making. More specifically, they focus
on cost/benefits and motivations for match-fixing such as low salary (see Cashmore & Cleland, 2014;
Hill, 2009b), delayed payment (see Hill, 2015), possible career progress (see Boeri & Severgnini,
2011), or coercion (see Carpenter, 2012). As such, the real moral obstacles with regard to the betting-
related variety of match-fixing are moral motivation and moral character. Given that certain steps are
more concerned with particular types of match-fixing, betting-related match-fixing will not be
prevented by raising moral awareness and increasing moral judgment, as both elements are already
present within the persons involved. These obstacles need to be tackled in a different manner:
external pressures that lead to consenting to fix a match need to be dealt with. Examples are financial
and/or material inducements (see Hill, 2009a, 2009b), which can make an athlete, coach, or referee
consent even when his/her moral judgment says not to. Another pressure that plays a major role,
although our results did not support this, is the fear of threats and violence for the athletes, coaches,
or referees themselves as well as for their families (see Boniface et al., 2012; FIFPro, 2012).
Most people (65.5%) involved in both types of fixing kept the information to themselves when they
were confronted with facts or suspicions. This is a troublesome finding and can point to the hurdle that is
posed in the fourth step of Rest’s (1986) model: when athletes are confronted with a match-fixing
proposal, it is of utter importance that they can easily blow the whistle (Singh, 2011). Whistleblowers’
protection/support acts as an antidote to group/organizational pressure and an inherent culture of fear of
retaliation and alienation when people want to raise match-fixing concerns (Webley &Werner, 2008). If
not, these hurdles may prohibit them from abstaining from match-fixing proposals.
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Practical implications
The results of this research have important practical implications for the sports field. Current preventive
measures and initiatives need to be intensified and, where necessary, adjusted to the specific challenges
(i.e., betting-related/non-betting-related) faced by the respective sports disciplines. Specific prevention
programs for the different types of match-fixing need to be put in place. As the findings suggest, both
types are different “diseases” that clearly ask for different remedies. In the case of non-betting-related
match-fixing, much effort needs to be put into raising (moral) awareness and guiding moral judgment,
e.g., by providing effective ethical codes on the issue (Constandt, De Waegeneer, & Willem, 2019; De
Waegeneer, Devisch, &Willem, 2017). Athletes, coaches, and/or referees have to clearly steer away from
these so-called “friendly gestures” or “folk practices” and need to firmly condemn non-betting-related
match-fixing. On the other hand, betting-relatedmatch-fixing asks for other preventivemeasures such as
a trustworthy whistleblowing protection program (Singh, 2011;Webley &Werner, 2008). To summarize
the interpretation of the results, Table 6 depicts an overview of the features of the two major types of
match-fixing.
Conclusion
This study indicates that match-fixing is not an absent or unknown phenomenon in Flemish soccer,
tennis, and badminton. Almost one fifth of the respondents testified of direct and/or indirect match-
fixing incidents. Moreover, non-betting-related match-fixing—with its own characteristics and
threats—appears to be much more common in Flanders than the betting-related variety of match-
fixing. Additionally, this study enriches the current match-fixing literature, using the lens of Rest’s
(1986) moral decision-making theory. As such, the twofold nature of match-fixing clearly comes into
view when looking at the moral decision-making process of those involved. More specifically, in the
case of non-betting-related match-fixing, the people involved often lack (moral) awareness of the
issue and do not judge it as (morally) wrong, whereas those involved in betting-related match-fixing
are usually more confronted with moral challenges such as (external) inducements and/or pressures.
Both types of match-fixing are clearly different “diseases” that require different preventive measures.
Limitations and future research
This research included a limited number of participants involved on a (semi-) professional level (14.8%).
Accordingly, it is difficult to draw conclusions from this group. Furthermore, some analyzed subsamples
are quite small (e.g., only three respondents were approached personally for a betting-related fix, and
only seven participants consented to a match-fixing proposal). Consequently, it is difficult to draw strong
conclusions in relation to these subgroups. A third limitation of this research is the possibility of a self-
selection bias since comparing the results of both groups of respondents (i.e., those who were contacted
in a sports club or at a tournament to complete the survey and those who completed the questionnaire
Table 6. Features of the Two Major Types of Match-fixing.
non-betting-related match-fixing betting-related match-fixing
gender: man gender: man
discipline: mostly soccer discipline: soccer, tennis
mostly amateur level mostly (semi-) professional level
manipulation of the result (loss or win) manipulation of the result + spot-fixing
approached by the opposite team approached by teammates, the opposite team, or by bettors
(organized crime)
motivation: prevention of relegation motivation: financial gain
at stake: money and/or consumption goods at stake: money
no threat or aggression involved threat and aggression are possible/likely
hurdle: moral sensitivity + moral judgment hurdle: moral motivation + moral character
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through email or Facebook) only gave an indication of the representativeness of our final sample for the
selected population. A fourth limitation of this research is the possibility of a social desirability bias, as
some respondents may not have been willing to admit to forms of corruption. However, by using an
anonymous approach, this type of bias was reduced (Joinson, 1999; Nederhof, 1985; Paulhus, 1984). In
addition to this limitation, which is inherent to corruption research (see Kihl, 2018), this study also
investigated only three sports disciplines. Other sports, such as baseball, martial arts, and cycling are
worthy of investigation as well, and this could shed a broader light on the types of fixing and their
accompanying processes and rationales. Moreover, the geographical scope of our research was limited to
Flanders. Other motivations and practices could be the case in other regions, and therefore, a broader
geographical area needs to be covered in future research. This way, different cultural perspectives on
what is acceptable and what is not (i.e., specific moral judgments) can be made explicit, which could
enable preventive measures to be more customized and, therefore, more effective. Additionally, it would
also be interesting to investigate the influence of contemporary preventive measures in sports clubs on
the willingness to report match-fixing suspicions or experiences by their members, which would make it
possible to detect the most effective preventive measures. Another suggestion for future research can be
found in the study of relegation to lower leagues. Analysis of the end-of-season results in soccer, for
instance (see Elaad, Krumer, & Kantor, 2018), could shed light on non-betting-related fixing.
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